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MINIMIZING THE RISK OF THE UNDESERVED
SCARLET LETTER: AN URGENT CALL TO AMEND
§ 168 1E(B) OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
Elizabeth Doyle O'Brien+
"A poor credit history is the 'Scarlet Letter' of 20th century America."' The
mechanism that attempts to capture an accurate picture of a consumer's credit
history is the consumer report,2 which is often the sole ingredient in
determining a consumer's creditworthiness.
The widespread usage of
consumer reports is reflected in the large percentage of U.S. households that
rely on credit. In 2001, seventy-five percent of households in the United States
held some type of debt, whether through consumer credit markets or mortgage
credit markets. 3 In an age where consumers rely on credit for purchases
ranging from real estate to groceries, the accuracy of a consumer's credit report
is of paramount importance. In a 2001 speech, Federal Trade Commission
+ J.D. Candidate, 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Ralph J. Rohner for introducing her to the complexities of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and for his time, patience, and tough questions that guided
the writing of this paper. The author would also like to thank her family for their patience and
love. Finally, the author thanks her fellow Catholic University Law Review staff members and
editors for their invaluable contributions to this Comment.
1. FairCredit Reporting Act: How it Functionsfor Consumers and the Economy: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th
Cong. (2003) [hereinafter June 4, 2003 Hearings] (statement of Anthony Rodriguez, Staff
Attorney, National Consumer Law Center); see also James P. Nehf, A Legislative Frameworkfor
Reducing Fraud in the Credit Repair Industry, 70 N.C. L. REV. 781, 783 (1992) (This article
asserts that a poor credit history "can prevent a consumer from obtaining a broad range of
valuable services. A consumer's ability to receive credit, to rent an apartment, to cash a check, to
secure insurance, or to obtain employment all may be jeopardized.").
2. 15 U.S.C. § 168la(d)(l)(A) (2000). A "consumer report" is defined in the FCRA as
"any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency
bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used... for the purpose of serving
as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility" for general purposes, including credit "to be
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." Id. The FCRA also details certain
exclusions to this definition of consumer report. See 15 U.S.C. § 168 1a(d)(2) (2000 & Supp. III
2003). For example, one exclusion to this definition of a consumer report covers communications
made by a consumer reporting agency (CRA) to a prospective employer of the consumer. Id.§
1681a(d)(2)(D); id.§ 1681a(o) (2000). For a discussion of how recent amendments to the FCRA
greatly expanded the exclusions to the definition of the term "consumer report" see Jacqueline S.
Akins, FairCredit Reporting-The New Look, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 324, 324 (1998).
3. MICHAEL E. STATEN & FRED H. CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING
UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: THE RISK OF NEW RESTRICTIONS AND STATE
REGULATION 5 (2003) [hereinafter STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT

REPORTING], available at http://www.flc.gov/bcp/workshops/infoflows/statements/cate02.pdf.
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(FTC) Chairman Timothy J. Muris lauded the process
4 that makes this all
possible, referring to it as "the miracle of instant credit."
Efficient credit reporting not only allows consumers access to credit, but has
also become a key contributor to the productivity of the United States
economy.5 In passing the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in 1970,
Congress acknowledged the need for reasonable procedures and accurate credit
reporting. 6 Congress explicitly outlined a set of compliance procedures to
ensure accurate credit reporting. Specifically, the FCRA requires consumer
reporting agencies7 (CRAs) to "follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy
of the information concerning the individual about
8
relates."
report
the
whom
Because accurate credit reporting is so important to the efficiency of the
country's credit markets and the economy as a whole, 9 the FCRA's accuracy
provisions are critically important both to the economy and to consumers. In

4. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Privacy 2001
Privacy: 2002 and Beyond (Oct. 4, 2001),
Conference: Protecting Consumers'
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privispl002.shtm
[hereinafter Muris Speech] (internal
quotation marks omitted). When Muris' tenure as FTC chairman began in 2001, consumer
advocate groups were worried about some of his initial positions. See Stephen Labaton, The
Regulatory Signals Shift: F.T.C. Serves as Case Study of Differences Under Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2001, at Cl (stating that consumer groups have criticized Muris for his appointments to
the consumer protection bureau and the fact that he argued on behalf of a CRA that the FCRA
was unconstitutional before assuming his position as FTC chairman).
5. STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 20.
Staten and Cate stated that "[t]he availability of comprehensive and timely credit report data
contributes to the mobility of both labor and capital in the U.S. economy. As a result, credit
reporting is arguably one of the key elements of the U.S. infrastructure that underpins the
remarkable productivity growth of the past decade." Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1(b) (2000) (The purpose of the FCRA is "to require that consumer
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer
credit ... in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer .... "); see also 115 CONG.
REC. 2410 (1969) [hereinafter Introduction of the Fair Credit Reporting Bill] (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (introducing the Fair Credit Reporting bill and referring to the growth of the credit
reporting industry as "somewhat alarming" but contending that "what is even more alarming is
the fact the system has been built up with virtually no public regulation or supervision").
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) ("[C]onsumer reporting agency means any person which
...regularly engages in... the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information
or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties."). The three major consumer reporting agencies include Equifax, Experian, and Trans
Union Corporation. Robert B. Avery et al., An Overview of Consumer Data and Consumer
Reporting, FED. REs. BULL., 47 n.1 (Feb. 2003), available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2003/0203lead.pdf. Each of these agencies maintains records on roughly "1.5 billion
credit accounts held by approximately 190 million individuals." Id. at 49.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1e(b) (emphasis added).
9. See STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 7
("[T]he macroeconomic benefits from smoothly functioning consumer credit markets can be
linked back to the establishment of a comprehensive system for sharing customer borrowing and
payment histories." (emphasis omitted)).
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introducing the bill that would later become the law, Senator William Proxmire
stated that the purpose of the FCRA would be to "establish certain Federal
safeguards over the activities of credit reporting agencies in order to protect
10
consumers against arbitrary, erroneous, and malicious credit information."
Since its enactment in 1970,11 there has been no change to § 13
1681e(b) of the
FCRA,12 despite massive overhauls in other parts of the FCRA.
Although the statutory language of § 1681e(b) clearly requires maximum15
possible accuracy, 14 courts are divided on how to interpret this requirement.
Some courts adopt the view that a CRA fails to satisfy the maximum possible
accuracy requirement of § 168le(b) if it reports information about a consumer
that might be factually correct but could be interpreted as misleading or not
complete.
Alternatively, other courts adopt the view that under the FCRA a
CRA has a duty only to report information that is "technically accurate."' 17 In
order for the FCRA to continue to ensure accurate credit reporting, a CRA's
duty to assure maximum possible accuracy is not fulfilled if information on a
consumer's 18credit report is technically accurate yet factually misleading or
incomplete.
10. Introduction of the Fair Credit Reporting Bill, supra note 6, at 2410 (statement of Sen.
Proxmire).
11. Amendment of Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x).
12. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 168 1e(b), with Amendment of Consumer Credit Protection Act §
607(b), 84 Stat. at 1131.
13. See Jeffrey Taft & Christina Poulon, The FACTAct: The Latest Attempt at Overhauling
the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Fairness and Accuracy of Consumer Reports, 121
BANKING L.J. 194, 195 (2005) (outlining the "many significant additions and changes to the
FCRA" including amendments to prevent identity theft, enhance the standards of accuracy of
consumer reports, and increase consumer access to consumer reports); see also Stephen Gardner,
Credit Reports: Basic Rights and Responsibilities of Creditors and Consumers, 59 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 248, 248 (2005) (highlighting the changes that the FACT Act effected on the basic
rights and duties of CRAs and creditors).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
15. Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 1991)
("[C]ourts have . . .widely diverged in their interpretations of what constitutes an 'accurate'
credit report."). Compare Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[W]e are inclined to believe that section 168le(b) covers at least some types of incomplete
information."), with Grant v. TRW, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 690, 692 n.1(D. Md. 1992) (finding that
because the "completeness" of a credit report is not included as a requirement in § 168 1e(b), it is
a necessary part of a § 168 1e(b) analysis).
16. See Koropoulos, 734 F.2d at 45 (incorporating an inquiry into the completeness of
plaintiffs' credit reports as a basis for remanding the case to the district court to determine
whether the CRA complied with the requirements of§ 168 1e(b)).
17. See id.at 40 (discussing the technical accuracy approach taken by some courts); see also
Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (rejecting
plaintiffs' claim that the CRA violated § 168le(b) because the plaintiffs failed to dispute the
technical accuracy of their credit report).
18. See Koropoulos, 734 F.2d at 40 (rejecting the interpretation that § 1681e(b) requires
only technical accuracy). Instead, this court looked to the legislative history of the FCRA to
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This Comment will explore the meaning of "maximum possible accuracy"
as a threshold requirement for a § 168le(b) claim. First, it will examine the
drafters' original purpose in enacting the FCRA as a statute to protect
consumers. Next, this Comment will highlight how courts have interpreted the
maximum possible accuracy requirement. This section will show how some
courts interpret maximum possible accuracy to require that information be
factually correct and not misleading or incomplete, whereas other courts state
that maximum possible accuracy requires that a CRA adhere to a very low
standard of mere technical accuracy of information in a consumer report. This
Comment will then analyze these different approaches, showing that, in light
of the purpose of the FCRA, the standard for maximum possible accuracy must
be as expansive as possible, to require both accuracy and completeness of
consumer reports. Next, this Comment will discuss how the lack of uniformity
among the courts in defining maximum possible accuracy weakens the
application of the FCRA. Moreover, to resolve this weakness, Congress
should amend § 1681e(b) to require both maximum possible accuracy and
completeness. Finally, this Comment will conclude by summarizing the
ambiguities in the law concerning the meaning of maximum possible accuracy
and will reiterate the need for a statutory amendment.
I. THE Two

SIDES OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: STATUTORY TEXT
AND THE MEANING IMPOSED BY THE COURTS

A. The U.S. CreditReporting System
As a consequence of the implementation of the FCRA, the United States has
the "most robust credit information system in the world."' 19 Studies have
shown that the majority of households in the United States have held some
type of debt, owned credit cards, or participated in the consumer and mortgage
credit markets.2 °

show that "Congress did not limit the Act's mandate to reasonable procedures to assure only
technical accuracy; to the contrary, the Act requires reasonable procedures to assure 'maximum
accuracy."' Id.
19. STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 4;
see also June 4, 2003 Hearings, supra note 1, at 90 (testimony of Paul Wohkittel, president of
Lenders' Credit Services) (advocating that "the United States credit reporting system, in a macro
sense, is the best such system in the world"). The kinds of benefits to which American consumers
have access include:
(a) widespread access to credit across the age and income spectrum, (b) relatively low
interest rates on secured loans (e.g., home mortgages, automobiles), (c) exceptionally
broad access to open end, unsecured lines of credit (e.g., bank card products), and (d)
relatively low default rates across all types of consumer loans.
STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 4.
20. STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 5. In
2001, seventy-five percent of U.S. households held some type of debt and partook in the
consumer and mortgage credit markets. Id. In 2001, about seventy-three percent of all
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Both the consumer and the U.S. economy benefit from a consumer's use of
credit. Credit offers a "'bridge' [to consumers] that can sustain them through
temporary disruptions and declines in incomes. 2 1 Moreover, a consumer's
use of credit reveals optimism about the consumer's expectations of her future
income. 2 Finally, studies have shown that the United States "enjoys a
macroeconomic growth advantage as a consequence of its well-developed
consumer credit markets." 23 Because of these well-developed consumer credit
markets, consumers
enjoy the benefits of increased competition among credit
4
2

providers.

The basis of the ease of transferability and increased competition of the
credit industry is the consumer report, the vehicle by which credit information
on a consumer is efficiently transferred. 25 Consumer reports allow lenders to
"pierce the fog of uncertainty" that a potential new creditor presents. 26
Consumer reports are an effective way of presenting information on a potential
borrower because they present a complete picture of a consumer's past and
present credit behavior.
In addition to providing information to potential
households owned at least one credit card, such as Visa or American Express. Id. Additionally,
nearly one-third of all U.S. households possessed loans or leases for automobiles. Id
21.

STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 7

("Research has shown that credit markets that make loans accessible to large segments of the
population provide a cushion that neutralizes the macroeconomic drag associated with temporary
declines in income, lowering the risk of outright recession and reducing the magnitude of
downturns when they do occur." (emphasis omitted)).
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also June 4, 2003 Hearings,supra note 1, at 90 (testimony
of Paul Wohkittel, President of Lenders' Credit Services) (relying upon his diverse experiences
working with the credit markets in Central Asia and Eastern Europe to testify about the strength
of the U.S. credit market). Mr. Wohkittel further testified that his experiences in constructing a
credit bureau in Kazakhstan has allowed him to incorporate some of the best aspects of the FCRA
and the U.S. credit system into these international endeavors. Id.
24.

STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 17

("The ability of new entrants to use credit report data to establish and cultivate relationships with
customers thousands of miles away has transformed the competitive landscape in the United
States ... ").
25. See Nehf, supra note I, at 783 (noting the increased efficiency of our country's credit
markets when the information on a consumer's credit report is accurate and complete).
26. STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 11
(internal quotation marks omitted). What makes a new borrower so uncertain for a creditor is the
potential risk that characterizes the new borrower. Id. Thus, "[r]isk assessment based on credit
bureau data rewards those consumers who find a way to make their payments." Id. at 12; see also
Avery et al., supra note 7, at 50-51 ("[R]esearch and creditor experience has consistently
indicated that credit reporting company information, despite any limitations that it may have,
generally provides an effective measure of the relative credit risk posed by prospective
borrowers."). One side effect of the importance that creditors place on credit reports is to
"reinforce borrower incentives to manage credit wisely and avoid delinquencies and defaults."
STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 12.

27. See STATEN & CATE, supra note 3, at 11. Consumer credit reports contain information
from a wide array of sources and are updated daily. Id. For instance, the CRAs collect
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creditors, employers, or others who have a permissible purpose under the
FCRA to access a consumer's credit report, consumer reports also play an
important role in preventing fraud and protecting consumers from identity
theft.29 Although consumer reports are extremely important for creditors in
on the extent to which
evaluating a consumer's creditworthiness, the statistics
30
credit reports are accurate and complete is in dispute.
B. The Purpose of the FCRA is Consumer Protection
The FCRA is a statute designed to overcome deficiencies in the credit
reporting system and to empower consumers to correct inaccuracies in their
consumer credit reports. 3 1 This statute reflects Congress's recognition of the
"vital role" of CRAs in the banking system 32 and the "need to insure that

information on individual credit accounts from commercial banks, credit unions, and finance
companies. Avery et al., supra note 7, at 50. Utility and medical companies also provide
information to CRAs on accounts held by their customers. Id. Additionally, CRAs seek out
information from public records, such as court records and records from other government
entities. Id. Accordingly, an estimated two billion items of information are processed by each of
the three major CRAs each month. Id.at 49.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2000 & Supp. V 2003) (discussing permissible purposes of
consumer reports). The FCRA outlines under which circumstances a CRA "may furnish a
consumer report." Id.§ 1681 b(a). For example, CRAs are permitted to fumish consumer reports
in response to court orders, in accordance with the written instructions of the consumer about
whom the report relates, or to a person whom the CRA has reason to believe intends to use the
information in connection with a credit transaction. Id. See Raymond A. Chenault et al., Fair
Credit Reporting Act Update, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 655, 657-58 (2006) for a discussion
of recent case law regarding permissible purposes set forth in the FCRA. Another permissible
purpose is the furnishing of a consumer report in connection with prescreened offers of credit. 15
U.S.C. § 168 lb(c) (2000). See R. Scott Johnson, PrescreenedOffers-Useful, But Are They Firm
Offers of Credit?, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 593, 593-95 (2006) for a discussion of the
requirements for a prescreened offer of credit to fall within the scope of the permissible purposes
permitted in the FCRA. Additionally, someone who obtains and uses a consumer report for a
reason that is not defined as a permissible purpose under the FCRA can be held liable for
violating the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f).
29. STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 23.
30. Avery et al., supra note 7, at 50 (highlighting several studies that come to different
conclusions as to the accuracy of credit reports).
31. Elwin Griffith, The Quest for Fair Credit Reporting and Equal Credit Opportunity in
Consumer Transactions,25 U. MEM. L. REV. 37, 38-41 (1994) (arguing that the enactment of the
FCRA in the 1970s attempted to remedy abuses of the credit reporting system, including CRAs
that circulated false and inaccurate information on consumers and the consumers' inability to
challenge those inaccuracies).
The first section of the FCRA itself, "Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose,"
states that "[t]he banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate
credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting
methods undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the
banking system." 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3).
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consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities
with fairness,
33
impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy."
Senator Proxmire, a member of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
introduced the Fair Credit Reporting bill on January 31, 1969. In introducing
the proposed law, Senator Proxmire stated that "[p]erhaps the most serious
problem in the credit reporting industry is the problem of inaccurate or
misleading information.
Senator Proxmire's concern about
36 some of the
abuses of the credit reporting industry is evident in his remarks.
In order to combat some of the abuses of the industry, the statute succinctly
delineates the responsibilities of CRAs. Under the compliance procedures
section of the FCRA, Congress required that CRAs, when preparing consumer
reports, "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy
37
of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates."
Therefore, in order to state a successful § 1681e(b) claim, a plaintiff must
establish that: (1) her credit report contains inaccurate information; (2) the
inaccuracy is attributable to "defendant's failure to follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy;" (3) she was injured by this
failure; and (4) her injury
was the result of defendant's inclusion of the
38
inaccurate information.

33. Id § 1681(a)(4). Additionally, Congress designated that the purpose of the FCRA
requires consumer reporting agencies to "adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is
fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and
proper utilization of such information." Id.§ 168 1(b).
34. S.REP. No. 91-517, at 2 (1969).
35. Introduction of the Fair Credit Reporting Bill, supra note 6, at 2411 (statement of Sen.
Proxmire). Senator Proxmire urged the passing of a federal law that would "protect consumers
against arbitrary, erroneous, and malicious credit information." Id.at 2410.
36. Id. at 2411 (acknowledging the need to curb the abuses within the system, while also
desiring to "insure that the credit information system is responsive to the needs of consumers as
well as creditors"). In his statements, Senator Proxmire discussed the sources of error in credit
reporting, including confusion of identities, biased information, reliance on hearsay for credit
information, and basic computer errors. Id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b). Some commentators argue that this statutory language reflects a
"utilitarian view" because "some accuracy must be sacrificed so that the credit industry can
function in the way to which it has become accustomed." Gary Allen Gardner, The Fair Credit
Reporting Act: Implicationsfor 1999 and Beyond, 78 MICH. B.J. 298, 298 (1999).
38. Evantash v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV-1 188, 2003 WL 22844198,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 963 (3d. Cir. 1996));
see also Heupel v. Trans Union LLC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1239 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (offering a
similar interpretation of the prima facie case for a § 168le(b) violation); Grant v. TRW, Inc., 789
F. Supp. 690, 692 (D. Md. 1992) ("[T]he Eleventh Circuit has recently stated, 'in order to make
out aprimafacieviolation of ...[Section 168 1e(b)], the Act implicitly requires that a consumer
must present evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a report containing
"inaccurate" information."' (quoting Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151,
1156 (11 th Cir. 1991)) (alteration in original)).
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In its official commentary to the FCRA, the FTC expressly pronounces that
this section of the FCRA does not require error-free consumer reports. 39 If a
consumer report is deemed to be inaccurate, however, the consumer plaintiff
must prove that defendant CRA did not follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy.4 ° Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a), a consumer has
the right to dispute the completeness or accuracy of information in her
consumer report, and the CRA has the responsibility to conduct a "reasonable
reinvestigation" of the accuracy or completeness of the disputed information. 41

39. Commentary on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, App. (2007) ("If a
consumer reporting agency accurately transcribes, stores and communicates consumer
information received from a source that it reasonably believes to be reputable, and which is
credible on its face, the agency does not violate [§ 168 le(b)] by reporting an item of information
that turns out to be inaccurate.").
40. See Davis v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171 (N.D. Ala. 2004)
(articulating the rule as: "Equifax is not strictly liable under the FCRA merely for reporting
inaccurate information; rather, Plaintiff must show that Equifax failed to follow reasonable
procedures"); Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (stating that a court "does not need to reach the issue of reasonableness if it finds initially
that the report furnished was accurate").
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(l)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). This provision requires that the
consumer notify the agency either directly or indirectly though a reseller and requires that the
CRA conduct its "reasonable reinvestigation" free of charge within a thirty day period starting
from when the agency receives notice of the dispute. Id. This thirty day period is subject to an
extension of fifteen days if the consumer provides additional information relating to the
reinvestigation. Id. § 168li(a)(l)(B).
The scope of a CRA's duties to investigate sources in addition to the original source of its
information depends on factors including
(1) whether the consumer has alerted the reporting agency to the possibility that the
source may be unreliable or the reporting agency knows or should know that the source
is unreliable; and (2) the cost of verifying the accuracy of the source versus the possible
harm inaccurately reported information may cause the consumer.
Evantash, 2003 WL 22844198, at *5. However, the effectiveness of this reinvestigation system
has been questioned. See FED. TRADE COMMISSION BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT DISPUTE

PROCESS 27-30 (2006) [hereinafter FED. RESERVE SYSTEM REPORT] (contrasting the viewpoint
of consumer advocate groups, who believe that the reinvestigation process is flawed, with the
industry perspective that the reinvestigation process is working properly).
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C. FCRA Amendments Show a Desire to Enhance Accuracy Standards
The FCRA has been amended numerous times since its inception in 1970.42
However, the language of the FCRA specifically dealing with compliance
procedures remains unchanged from its original form.43
1. 1996 Amendments
After many years without substantial overhaul, the FCRA was amended in
1996 through the enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act
44
(CCRA).
Not only did the CCRA provide guidance on issues such as
prescreening and permissible uses of credit reports,4 5 but these revisions also
enhanced the accuracy of credit reporting by providing more opportunities for
consumers to access their credit reports to dispute and correct certain entries.46

42. Micheal F. McEneney & Karl F. Kaufmann, FairCredit Reporting Act Developments,
59 Bus. LAW. 1215, 1216 (2004) (summarizing some of the changes to the FCRA). The first
major change to the FCRA came in 1996, when Congress amended the FCRA to "improve the
accuracy of consumer reports and to strengthen consumers' ability to correct that information."
Id. (citing the amendment codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1618s-2 (2000)). In 2003, the FCRA was again
amended in an effort to improve the fairness and accuracy of consumer reports. Gardner, supra
note 13, at 248; see also Taft & Poulon, supra note 13, at 194 (analyzing changes to the FCRA
made by the 2003 Amendments).
43. Compare Amendment of Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §
607(b), 84 Stat. 1127, 1131 (1970) ("[W]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates."), with 15 U.S.C. §
168 le(b) (2000) ("[W]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report relates.").
44. Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
The CCRA was part of the voluminous Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1996, which affected several laws that concerned institutions dealing with consumer
financial services. Carl A. Ahem & Jeffrey P. Taft, The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act
of 1996: An Attempt to Make the FairCredit Reporting Act More Fair, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 304, 304 (1997) (noting that many of the revisions to the FCRA had been proposed in both
the House and the Senate in prior years, but had never been passed).
45. See MICHAEL E. STATEN & FRED H. CATE, DOES THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
PROMOTE ACCURATE CREDIT REPORTING? 15-17 (2004) [hereinafter STATEN & CATE, DOES

THE FRCA PROMOTE ACCURATE REPORTING], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
publications/finance/babc/bac_04-14.pdf; Ahern & Taft, supra note 44, at 305-07, 311-12.
46. STATEN & CATE, DOES THE FRCA PROMOTE ACCURATE REPORTING, supra note 45, at
15; see also Akins, supra note 2, at 327 (detailing the process of a CRA's reinvestigation of
consumer complaints about items on their consumer reports). The 1996 amendments expanded a
consumer's access to the contents of her credit report by requiring CRAs to disclose all
information in a consumer's file, not only her credit score. Id. The revisions also strengthened a
consumer's attempt to correct erroneous information found on her credit report by requiring that
CRAs delete disputed information that they cannot verify within thirty days. Id
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Moreover, these revisions emphasized the im7ortance of uniform national
standards in the regulation of the credit industry.
2. 2003 Amendments

The FCRA was amended again in 2003 through the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACT Act). 48 These amendments and relevant legislative
history demonstrate a desire to further enhance the accuracy standards found in
the FCRA. 4 9 The changes dealing with the accuracy of consumer credit
reporting established a few procedures to increase the accuracy of consumer
reports, including providing additional methods for a consumer to dispute the
validity of her consumer report.50 In addition, the legislative history of the

47.

STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 2

(noting that some state-level legislation nearly upset the effectiveness of the FCRA "by subjecting
key elements of the increasingly national credit reporting system to inconsistent state standards").
Equally important, the 1996 amendments safeguarded the national reporting system by
"preempt[ing] state and local laws that would impact specific core elements of the credit
reporting system." Id.
48. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
(2003).
49. Id. The 2003 amendments also include changes in the law that "address identity theft,
the accuracy of consumer reports, affiliate sharing, and prescreening." McEneney & Kaufmann,
supra note 42, at 1217. See FED. RESERVE SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 41, at 7 for a discussion
of the ways that the 2003 amendments to the FCRA affect the process by which consumers
dispute problems with their consumer reports.
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8) (Supp. V 2005) (establishing that consumers can now
dispute the accuracy of items found on their consumer reports directly with the furnisher of that
information, and not just with the CRA reporting the information). This provision also requires
that the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) and the FTC "jointly prescribe
regulations that shall identify the circumstances under which a furnisher shall be required to
reinvestigate a dispute concerning the accuracy of information contained in a consumer report on
the consumer, based on a direct request of a consumer." Id.
In addition, the FACT Act requires a data furnisher that provides negative information to one
or more CRAs to give notice to its customers when it does so. Id.§ 1681s-2(a)(7)(A)(i). The
statute also sets out a thirty-day time limit in providing this notice. Id. § 1681s-2(a)(7)(A)(ii).
See McEneney & Kaufmann, supra note 42, at 1220 for an analysis of the changes in the
responsibilities of data furnishers.
To further enhance the accuracy standards of the FCRA, the FACT Act also requires that the
federal banking agencies, the NCUA, and the FTC must "establish and maintain guidelines" to
which fumishers should adhere in order to ensure the "accuracy and integrity" of its consumer
information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(e)(1)(A)-(B). These guidelines are currently undergoing notice
and comment rulemaking procedures in the administrative agencies. See Interagency Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Procedures to Enhance the Accuracy and Integrity of Information
Furnished to Consumer Reporting Agencies Under Section 312 of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,944 (Dec. 13, 2007) (offering "proposed regulations to
implement the direct dispute provisions" of the FCRA).
Despite the importance of these guidelines with regard to the duties of furnishers, the term
"furnisher" is not defined within the FCRA. See FED. RESERVE SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 41,
at 4. While not specifically defined, fumishers are understood to be "entities that provide
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2003 amendments shows the importance of credit to the U.S. economy, the
need for consumer protection, and the need for accurate and fair credit
reporting.5 1
D. Courts Have ConflictingInterpretationsof the Maximum Possible
Accuracy Requirement
The threshold question in a § 168 1e(b) claim is the accuracy of a consumer's
report. 52 If a consumer's report is not accurate, then a court will determine
whether the CRA followed "reasonable procedures." 53 However, the54meaning
of maximum possible accuracy has varied greatly from court to court.
1. Maximum PossibleAccuracy Means That the Information Must Be
Factually Correctand Cannot Be Misleading or Incomplete
The seminal case in the debate over the meaning of maximum possible
accuracy is Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau Inc., in which the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit established a balancing test in order to determine whether a
1681e(b) violation occurred.5 5 In Koropoulos, the plaintiffs' applications for
various credit cards were denied on the basis of bad credit reports issued by
Credit Bureau Incorporated (CBI) of Georgia. 56 Mr. Koropoulos' poor credit
report resulted from him defaulting on payments for a loan that he had
information about their customers to CRAs, including information about customers' payments on
their accounts." Id.
51. See, e.g., June 4, 2003 Hearings, supra note 1, at 90 (written testimony of Paul
Wohkittel, President of Lenders' Credit Services) (advocating on behalf of the credit industry for
a credit reporting structure that "to fairly and efficiently accommodate the needs of lenders while
offering solid and strong protections[ to consumers]"); H.R. 2622-Fair and Accurate Credit
TransactionsAct of 2003: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 8-10 (2003)
[hereinafter July 9, 2003 Hearings] (testimony of John W. Snow, Sec'y, Dep't of the Treasury)
(emphasizing the need for accurate credit reporting and the importance of "information pooling"
that has allowed many lower income people access to credit opportunities).
In a hearing of the House Financial Services Committee, Treasury Secretary Snow emphasized
the importance of the FCRA by remarking that "the FCRA is the invisible infrastructure of the
credit markets of the United States, and that invisible infrastructure makes possible the most
extensive and widely available credit at the best rates anywhere in the world." July 9, 2003
Hearings,supra, at 9 (testimony of John W. Snow, Sec'y, Dep't of the Treasury).
52. Evantash v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV-1 188, 2003 WL 22844198,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003); see also Heupel v. Trans Union LLC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1239
(N.D. Ala. 2002).
53. Heupel, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
54. Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156-57 (lth Cir. 1991)
(stating that courts have "widely diverged in their interpretations of what constitutes an 'accurate'
credit report").
55. Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 38. Mr. Korpoulos was denied credit on a number of occasions, including being
denied a credit card from the Bank of Virginia. Id. Mrs. Koropoulos' application for a credit
card from Lord & Taylor was denied as well. Id. Both denials were attributed to a poor credit
report from CBI. Id.
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57
obtained from Virginia National Bank approximately four years earlier.
surrounding the denial of credit to Mrs.
However, the circumstances
58
Koropoulos were less clear.
The plaintiffs' attorney contacted the credit bureau in January 1982, and the
credit bureau turned over Mr. Koropoulos' file, which showed a balance of
59
zero dollars on the bank loan. The report also showed a current status of "19"

meaning "that [the bank] either wrote the loan off as a bad debt, placed it for
collection, instituted a civil suit against the debtor to
6 0 collect it, or determined
that the debtor 'skipped' (i.e., could not be located).
Six months later, Mr. and Mrs. Koropoulos filed suit under the FCRA
against the credit bureau "alleging that this characterization of the [bank] loan
was misleading," especially considering that the credit bureau knew as of
November 1977 that the loan had been repaid in full. 6 1 The district court
granted the credit bureau's summary judgment motion and dismissed the
Koropoulos' claims of the inaccuracies in the report. 62 The court found that
"the rating was accurate," citing that there was indeed a balance of zero
dollars, and that the bank lost forty percent of the money Mr. Koropoulos owed
64
63
in collection costs. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their FCRA claims.
The D.C. Circuit extensively reviewed the case law concerning § 1681e(b)
liability65 and rejected the district court's analysis on the basis that it, in
essence, made a CRA "liable for damages only if the report contains
statements that are technically untrue." 66 The court then cited the purpose of
the FCRA in support of its position that the FCRA requires CRAs to maintain
"reasonable procedures to assure 'maximum accuracy. ' '67 The court created a
balancing test to determine whether a violation of § 1681e(b) occurred.6 8
Following this rationale, a court should "weigh the potential that the
information will create a misleading impression against the availability of
57. Id. Mr. Koropoulos had defaulted on a loan of just over $2,000 in June 1976. Id. By
November 1977, Mr. Koropoulos repaid the entire loan in addition to a forty percent collection
fee to Nationwide Credit Corporation, the company to whom the bank sent the defaulted loan for
collection. Id.
58. Id. at 39. Plaintiffs alleged that since CBI claimed to have never sent a report at all on
Mrs. Koropoulos, CBI may have erroneously sent Mr. Koropoulos' report out in a request for
credit information on Mrs. Koropoulos. Id.
59. Id at 38.
60. Id.
61. Id. Mr. Koropoulos' concern about the misleading characterization of the debt was that
"[the bank] wrote the loan off as a total loss, and that Mr. Koropoulos never paid the debt." Id.
62. Id. at 39.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 39-40.
66. Id. at 40.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 42.
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more accurate69 [or complete] information and the burden of providing such
information.,
The D.C. Circuit also examined the issue of a CRA's duty under the FCRA
when it reviewed plaintiffs' claims that the credit bureau's credit reporting was
so imprecise that it could not ensure "a reasonable procedure" for maximum
possible accuracy, as required by the statute. 70 The court concluded that the
duty imposed on CRAs by the FCRA calls for CRAs to "adopt reasonable
procedures to ensure complete and precise [credit] reporting. '71 As to whether
the credit bureau failed to fulfill this standard of reasonable procedures, the
court held that the record was "too sparse" to make a conclusion and left the
decision to the district court on remand.72
The court's analysis shows a willingness to bring the concept of
completeness of the information in credit reports into its analysis of maximum
possible accuracy.73 The court determined that, based on the legislative history
of § 168 le(b), "Congress did not ... intend to exclude altogether incomplete
74
reports from section 1681e(b)'s requirement of reasonable procedures.,
Consequently, the court considered the completeness of the Koropoulos' credit
report in determining whether the credit bureau achieved the requisite level of
75
maximum possible accuracy.
Many courts have relied on the Koropoulos decision. In 2003, for instance,
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that it would apply the Koropoulos
balancing test because the Third Circuit does not allow the "technical accuracy
defense. 76 In Evantash v. G.E. CapitalMortgage Services, Inc., the plaintiff's
husband filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and included an account in
77
which both he and his wife, plaintiff Mrs. Evantash, were co-obligors. Once
69. Id.
70. Id.at 42-43.
71. Id. at 45. The court stated that "we do not suggest that the Act requires all relevant
credit information be included in agencies' reports ....
" Id.
72. Id. (The court claimed that the record did not provide enough information "for [it] to
conclude at this early stage in the proceeding either that [the credit bureau's] '9' classification is
so broad that it unreasonably fails to distinguish between fundamentally different credit histories,
or that it is sufficiently narrow to be reasonable."). The court noted that no matter how the
district court were to come out on the issue of reasonableness, the plaintiffs must still show that
CBI's system of classification somehow caused them harm in order to be entitled to punitive
damages. Id. at 45 n.14 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, which provides "punitive damages [are]
available for willful violation of the Act").
73. See id.
at 43-44.
74. Id. at 44. The court reasoned that the absence of "completeness" from the maximum
possible accuracy requirements in the statute may have been the result of this provision being
"added so late in the legislative process." Id.
75. Id. at 42-43.
76. See Evantash v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV-1188, 2003 WL
22844198, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003).
77. Id. at * 1. The account was for a mortgage with defendant, G.E. Capital Mortgage
Services, Inc. Id.
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another defendant, Trans Union LLC, received notification of this bankruptcy
filing, Trans Union recorded the bankruptcy filing on Mrs. Evantash's credit
report. 78 Plaintiffs application for a line of credit from Dial National Bank to
purchase a dishwasher was later denied, and the bank cited this bankruptcy as
the reason for its denial.79 Mrs. Evantash repeatedly requested that Trans
Union remove the bankruptcy notation from her credit report, but because of
communications with G.E. Capital that reaffirmed the bankruptcy, Trans
Union removed and reinserted the notation multiple times throughout the next
few months.
The district court sided with Mrs. Evantash and relied on the
Koropoulos framework to determine that there was a genuine issue of material
fact of whether Trans Union represented the account on the plaintiffs credit
report in a way that was "so misleading" that it made her report inaccurate
under § 168le(b).8 1
More recently, a California district court, in Yourke v. Experian Information
Solutions, Inc., relied on Koropoulos to deny the defendant's motion for
summary judgment and to find a triable issue of fact in a case in which the
plaintiff had attempted to have five tax liens removed from his consumer
report.
The IRS released the liens once plaintiff filed the returns for those
years, yet Experian, a CRA, improperly reported only two of the five as
released, creating a problem of misleading information on the plaintiffs credit
report.83 The court held that both Experian's original reporting of misleading
information and continued inclusion of that information after plaintiff brought
it to Experian's attention presented a triable issue of fact for a § 168le(b)

78. Id. Trans Union recorded this filing on plaintiffs credit report as "INCLUDED IN
BANKRUPTCY." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. at *1-2. The court delineated, in substantial detail, all of the correspondence
between Mrs. Evantash, G.E. Capital, and Trans Union that caused the bankruptcy notation to be
removed and reinserted on a number of occasions. Id.
81. Id. at*4.
82. Yourke v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. C 06-2370, 2007 WL 1795705, at *5
(N.D. Cal. June 20, 2007). In this case, plaintiff was assessed five tax liens for not filing a series
of tax returns in which he claimed he did not have any tax liability. Id. at * 1.
83. Id. at * 1. Yourke first contacted Experian's customer service department in an attempt
to correct the inaccurate reporting of his tax liens. Id On October 27, 2005, Yourke contacted
Experian in writing and included letters from the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) that showed that
Yourke had paid all taxes and penalties and FTB filed a "release of lien" for each tax lien. Id.
Over the next few months, Yourke and Experian discussed how the released liens would be
reported on his consumer report. Id. at *1-2. Finally, in April 2006, Experian reported a zero
dollar balance on the tax liens. Id. at *2.
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violation. 84 In addition, the court emphasized85 the plaintiffs diligence and
persistence in attempting to rectify the situation.
2. Technical Accuracy Defense: Other Courts Put a Low Burden on CRAs
to Ensure Maximum PossibleAccuracy
Many courts interpret the maximum possible accuracy requirements of the
FCRA very strictly. One case from the nascence of the FCRA demonstrates
this hard-line approach to the accuracy requirement. In Todd v. Associated
Credit Bureau Services, Inc., the court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on the plaintiffs' § 168 1e(b) claims. 87 After the plaintiffs failed
to pay off a balance of $1,200.00 on their account with Hess' department store,
Hess' sent the account to General Credit Control for collection. 88 About two
years later, in September 1974, the plaintiffs had fully paid all money owed to
Hess'. 89 In November 1975, however, the plaintiffs' credit report continued to
show that, as of 1973, they owed 9Hess'
$1,200, but failed to mention that the
0
plaintiffs eventually paid the debt.
In analyzing whether Associated, as the CRA, followed reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy under § 168 le(b), the court
noted that it "does not need to reach the issue of reasonableness if it finds
initially that the report furnished was accurate." 91 The court concluded that the
report furnished by Associated was
"not inaccurate" and that, consequently,
92
the Todds had no cause of action.

84. Id. at *5 ("Experian's continued inclusion of the liens as released but with the full
amount for which they were originally filed could be viewed as misleading.").
85. Id. The court cited Experian's delay in responding to Yourke's request for corrections
as well as Yourke's "continued pressure" on Experian to make the changes as enough to create a
triable issue as to the reasonableness required by § 168 1i(a) of the reinvestigation process. Id.
86. See, e.g., Davis v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170-72 (N.D. Ala.
2004) (showing a strict interpretation of the maximum possible accuracy requirement by not
holding the CRA liable for maintaining an incomplete consumer report on the plaintiff). In
Davis, the court determined that the CRA did not violate § 168 1e(b) when it deleted the plaintiff's
mortgage account from her consumer report, even though the plaintiff protested the entry because
it reflected late payments. Id.at 1171.
87. Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 450 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
aff'd, 578 F.3d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978). In addition to bringing suit against Associated Credit Bureau
Services (Associated), the plaintiff also brought his suit against Hess', Inc. (Hess'), and General
Credit Control, Inc. (General). Id.at 448.
88. Id.at 448.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.at 449. The court immediately granted summary judgment in favor of Hess' and
General because neither fell within the definition of a CRA and therefore would not have been
subject to the statutory requirements of this section of the FCRA. Id.
92. Id. The court provided a very terse and cursory analysis in order to come to this
conclusion. See id The court noted that the Todds did not dispute that their account reached
$1,200 in October 1972, which caused Hess' to charge the debt to profit and loss and to give the
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The Southern District of New York recently took the Todd approach one
step further. In Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, the court dismissed the plaintiff s

§ 1681e(b) claim against TRW Credit Data, a CRA, 93 and held that the CRA's
reliance on bankruptcy court documents in preparing plaintiffs credit report
was appropriate,
despite the plaintiffs protest of the accuracy of some of those
94
documents.

In Boothe, the plaintiff borrowed money on many occasions from Avco
Financial Services.9 5 Avco requested copies of plaintiffs credit profile from
TRW, a company that furnished credit information on consumers to its
subscribers. 96 A few months later, the plaintiff requested that TRW provide
him copies of his credit profiles, and TRW complied with each of plaintiffs
requests. 97 In one of those credit reports, the plaintiff found information that
he believed to be incorrect, including a bankruptcy petition filed years before
and false information on payment of 98a loan from another creditor, the New
York State Higher Education Services.
On more than one occasion, the plaintiff requested that the information be
corrected. 99 He also requested, multiple times, that TRW add a statement to

his profile showing that he disputed the accuracy of the bankruptcy petition
and the loan with Higher Education Services.100 Finally, in March 1988, TRW
added a short consumer statement concerning only the Higher Education
Services loan.10 ' After the plaintiff was denied a loan with Avco in May 1988,
he sued, alleging that10 2this denial of credit was caused by "an inaccurate credit
profile from TRW."

account to General for collection. Id. The court stated that "[t]hese facts are unquestionably
accurate" and held that this technical accuracy complied with § 1681 e(b). Id.
93. Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 768 F. Supp. 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In this case, the
court referred to § 168 1e(b) as a "607(b)" violation since that is the section number of the FCRA
itself. Id.at 435.
94. Id at 438.
95. Id.at 435.
96. Id.
97. Id.Boothe requested copies of his profiles on three separate occasions. Id.
98. Id. Boothe disputed his credit profile's reference to a bankruptcy petition that he had
filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in July 1981. Id.He also had a dispute with the balance of a loan
with the New York State Higher Education Services, which he claimed failed to show his
payments on the loan. Id.
99. Id. at 436. Boothe requested that the consumer statement be added to his profile on
three separate occasions: twice in December 1987 and again in March 1988. Id.
100. Id. Boothe originally questioned the bankruptcy entry on his profile in February 1987,
and disputed the accuracy of his Higher Education Services loan in September 1987. Id.at 435.
101. Id.at 436. TRW added the statement "Idispute the amount [Higher Education Services]
says I owe." Id.
102. Id. Boothe, representing himself in this lawsuit, also alleged that TRW violated §
1681 i(a) of the FCRA that requires that a CRA shall reinvestigate within a reasonable amount of
time disputed information in a consumer's credit report so long as the CRA does not have reason
to believe that the consumer's request for reinvestigation is frivolous. Id.at 437-38.
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In analyzing whether TRW violated § 1681e(b) of the FCRA, the court
emphasized the official court documents from which TRW prepared its
consumer profile on the plaintiff.10 3 The court failed to consider any of the
plaintiff's attempts to have his credit profile revised, but instead focused on the
fact that the plaintiff offered no evidence to challenge the substance of these
documents themselves. 10 4 The court concluded, on that basis, that TRW
"conclusively established the accuracy of [plaintiff's] credit profile."' 10 5
Another recent case that relied heavily on Todd is Heupel v. Trans Union
LLC. 106 In this case, plaintiff Heupel's application for a Discover credit card

was rejected based on information of a bankruptcy action by the plaintiff that
the credit card company received from Trans Union, a CRA. 10 7 Upon
investigation, the plaintiff realized that the bankruptcy action reported on her
credit report was actually attributable to her ex-husband, who had filed for
bankruptcy after their divorce and reported an account with Dial Bank on
which she was a co-obligor. 10 8 Although Trans Union complied with most of
the plaintiffs requests for correction of her credit report, Heupel nonetheless
filed the action in early 2000.1° 9
In analyzing the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
acknowledged the position espoused by the court in Koropouos,110 but
concluded that following the analysis of Todd111 was more sound.'12 The court

103. Id. at 437-38. On the issue of the bankruptcy filing, the court stated that "[t]he petition
and the Bankruptcy Court order dismissing it, in view of Boothe's failure to controvert their
authenticity, are conclusive proof of Boothe's bankruptcy filing." Id. at 438.
104. Id. at 438.
105. Id. (holding that TRW "is entitled to summary judgment dismissing [plaintiffs §
1681 e(b)] claim").
106. See Heupel v. Trans Union LLC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
107. Id. at 1236-37. The plaintiff applied for the credit card in October 1999, and was
notified of her rejection later that month. Id. Discover stated that the principal reason that they
rejected Heupel's application was "BANKRUPTCY." Id. at 1237.
108. Id. at 1237. Heupel requested a copy of her credit report from Trans Union a few days
after she was denied for the credit card. Id. At that point she discovered that her status as "joint
obligor," on a Dial Bank account with her ex-husband, caused the bankruptcy notation on her
credit report even though her husband had filed the Chapter 13 bankruptcy after their divorce. Id.
Upon examining her report, the plaintiff also discovered other errors, including a reporting that
she was an obligor on two Fidelity Acceptance accounts, when she was only an obligor on one
such account. Id
109. Id. at 1238. Heupel's FCRA claims challenged the accuracy of several errors on her
credit report. See id. at 1239-40.
110. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Koropoulos balancing
test).
111. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Todd approach).
112. Heupel, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. The court acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit
identified both the Koropoulos and Todd approaches, and decided that a CRA "should be entitled
to summary judgment if it reports factually correct information." Id.
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reasoned that Todd'113is "fairer to reporting agencies and a better conservator of
judicial resources."
The court's discussion stressed reducing the burden of accurate credit
reporting on CRAs. 114 Moreover, the court decided that requiring "technical
accuracy" in credit reports would ensure the balance that Congress wanted to
keep between a consumer's desire for fair credit reporting and the goal of
CRAs to maintain "cost-effective credit reporting." 11 The court found that
Trans Union's reporting of the Dial Bank account was technically accurate,
and therefore the plaintiff did not have an actionable § 1681 e(b) claim.116
The Eleventh Circuit's hesitancy to adopt the Koropoulos approach for
evaluating the completeness of a credit report in making a § 168le(b) analysis
is seen in two cases from the 1990s. 117 In the first case, Cahlin v. General

Motors Acceptance Corp., the plaintiff claimed that he was denied credit
several times because of information on his credit report, which included the
denial of his application for a mortgage loan.11 8 The plaintiffs claims against
two CRAs, TRW and CBI, were based on how each CRA handled plaintiffs
complaints regarding a debt on a car lease with General Motors Acceptance
Corporation (GMAC). 119 Despite repeated attempts to correct his credit
report, 120 both CRAs reported that the plaintiff had unfavorable credit
information, namely that plaintiff had a debt to GMAC, even though GMAC
1-9
gave athebadplaintiff
debts. 12 signifying
CBI, for instance,
had
from allaccount,
while
that he had
debt, an
ratingreleased
for hishimGMAC

113. Id. at 1240 n.8.
114. Id. ("[R]equiring that each report be void of material omission would place too great a
burden on credit reporting agencies and could subject them to liability for omitting information of
which they did not and had no reason to know.").
115. Id.
Interestingly, the court discussed Trans Union's misreporting of
116. Id. at 1240-41.
Heupel's Fidelity account as "prima facie ... inaccurate reporting." Id. at 1239. However, the
court does not seem to take this into account when deciding that plaintiff did not have a case
under § 1681e(b). See id. The court ultimately granted Trans Union's motion for summary
judgment as to all of Heupel's allegations. Id. at 1242.
117. See Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 1991);
Grant v. TRW, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 690, 692 (D. Md. 1992).
118. Cahlin, 936 F.2dat 1155-56.
119. Id. at 1154-55. The plaintiff claims that when he leased a car for five years from
GMAC, a salesman made an oral promise that he could return the car within 90 days and be free
from obligations under the lease. Id. at 1154. The salesman's promise was not made in writing
so GMAC threatened the plaintiff with legal action. Id. GMAC released the plaintiffofall debts
upon settlement of the legal action. Id. at 1154-55.
120. Id at 1155. CBI continued to report that the plaintiff had an "19" rating with a balance
due of $3,383.44. Id. From August 1986 through October 1987, the plaintiff took numerous
steps to correct this erroneous rating, including mailing a customer dispute form and directing
written complaints to CBI. Id.
121. Id.at1154-55.

2008]

An Urgent Call to Amend § 1681e(b) of the FCRA

1235

simultaneously
reporting that plaintiff had a zero balance on that same
22
account.1
In Cahlin, the Eleventh Circuit held that although the FCRA requires that a
CRA make reasonable efforts to report 'accurate' information ...[the CRA]
has no duty to report only that information which is favorable or beneficial to
the consumer."' 23 As a result, the court rejected plaintiffs claim that "CBI
should have ceased reporting any derogatory credit information about his
GMAC account after the settlement in May, 1986."' '24 The court concluded
that CBI's seemingly-contradictory recording of the plaintiffs GMAC account
was "more accurate than the negative-free report" that the plaintiff desired.125
A year later, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Koropoulos approach. In
Grant v. TRW, Inc., plaintiffs application for a credit card was denied because
his credit report indicated that his landlord had received a judgment against
him. 126 In determining whether TRW "violated the FCRA by failing to follow
reasonable procedures assuring 'maximum possible accuracy,"' the court made
a clear distinction between a consumer report that is accurate and one that is
complete.! 27 The court stated that the qualitative difference between these two
standards is that accuracy "can be tested by verification" but completeness
"requires the exercise of judgment on potentially difficult questions concerning
128
the meaning and effect of contextual information."'
The Eleventh Circuit, in Grant, rejected the Koropoulos approach which
129
added a completeness element to the maximum possible accuracy analysis.
The court noted that although the plaintiff did not dispute the accuracy of the
notation on his credit report, he disputed the misleading nature of the
information and officially informed TRW of this concern.1 30 The court
ultimately denied TRW's motion to131dismiss because of its failure to properly
reinvestigate the plaintiffs dispute.

122. Id. at 1155.
123. Id. at 1158.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1159 n.19.
126. Grant v. TRW, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 690, 691 (D. Md. 1992). The judgment, which was
awarded a year earlier, amounted to $608.00. Id.
127. Id.at691-92.
128. Id.at 692.
129. Id. at 692 n. I ("[A]dding a 'completeness' element to § 1681 e(b) substantially expands
the duties imposed under consumer reporting agencies under the Act and exposes them to
dramatically increased litigation.").
130. Id.at 692.
131. See id.at 693.

1236

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 57:1217

II. DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE FCRA AND CASE LAW INTERPRETATION
WEAKEN THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FCRA

A. StandardsofAccuracy within the FCRA are Contradictory
In preparing consumer reports under § 168le(b), a CRA "shall follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
1 32
information concerning the individual about whom the report relates."
While perfect accuracy in credit reporting is an impossibility, 133 the FCRA
does not clearly identify how the phrase "maximum possible accuracy" should
be defined.134 Furthermore, § 1681i, titled "Procedure in case of disputed
accuracy," sets out the procedures that consumers and CRAs must follow "[i]f
the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a
consumer's file ... is disputed."'' 35 Completeness and accuracy are two very
different standards, and by requiring only accuracy in § 1681e(b) and
completeness
or accuracy in § 1681i, the FCRA creates two different
36
standards.'
As a result of this contradiction in the statute, courts have exhibited
37
different, and often conflicting, methods of incorporating these principles.'

132. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2000).
133. Virginia G. Maurer & Robert E. Thomas, Getting Credit Where Credit is Due:
Proposed Changes in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 617 (1997)
("[O]btaining perfect accuracy is expensive and probably not feasible due to the immense volume
of information processed by the agencies.").
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1157
(1 th Cir. 1991) (stating that because the statute does not define the accuracy standard in §
1681e(b), courts have exhibited a wide range of interpretations). The Cahlin court argued that
"[a]ccuracy is not quite clearly a self-defining concept, and FCRA's fragmentary legislative
history provides little, if any, guidance as to how Congress intended this statute to be applied."
Id.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (emphasis added); see also supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text (explaining the mechanics of the FCRA's reinvestigation
process).
136. See Grant v. TRW, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 690, 692 (D. Md. 1992) (discussing the
differences between an analysis of a credit report's accuracy and an analysis of its completeness).
The court stated that the qualitative difference between these two standards is that "[a]ccuracy
can be tested by verification" but "'completeness' required the exercise of judgment on
potentially difficult questions concerning the meaning and effect of contextual information." Id.
In contrast to the court's analysis in Grant, the Koropoulos court believed that the absence of
"completeness" from § 168le(b) was not intentional. See Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734
F.2d 37, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
137. Compare Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1157 (stating that the information needs only to be
"technically accurate," which can be satisfied by being incomplete), and Grant, 789 F. Supp. at
692 n. I (discussing the differences between accuracy and completeness and reasoning that
reading a completeness requirement into § 1681 e(b) is inappropriate), with Koropoulos, 734 F.2d
at 44 (introducing the concept of completeness into a 1681e(b) analysis), and Evantash v. G.E.
Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV-1188, 2003 WL 22844198, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25,
2003) (applying the Koropoulos approach to analyzing a § 1681 e(b) claim).
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For instance, in Grant v. TRW, Inc., the court concluded that incorporating the
concept of completeness of consumer reports into the maximum possible
accuracy standard of § 1681e(b) unnecessarily expanded the duties of
consumer reporting agencies. 38 Furthermore, in Cahlin, the Eleventh Circuit
emphasized the objective nature of the accuracy standard and stated that the
accuracy standard "should be interpreted in an evenhanded manner toward the
interests of both consumers and potential creditors."' 39 By contrast, in
Koropoulos, the court expressly stated that completeness of a consumer's
credit information should be part of the analysis to determine maximum
possible accuracy. 14 This confusion has resulted in courts taking varying
positions on the levels of duties that the CRAs have as far as ensuring the
accuracy of consumer reports. 141
B. FCRA is a Consumer ProtectionStatute, But the Case Law Interpretation
Does Not Always Reflect a Pro-ConsumerAttitude
The consumer-protection approach of the FCRA is explicitly stated in
various subsections of § 1681. 42 In drafting the FCRA, Congress did not
14 3
require mere "accuracy," but instead required "maximum possible accuracy."
The legislative history of the original version of the FCRA shows that
Congress prioritized consumer protection in drafting the statute.144 In addition,
138. Grant,789 F. Supp. at 692 n.l.
139. Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1158.
140. Koropoulos, 734 F.2d at 44. The court stated that "we are inclined to believe that
section 1681e(b) covers at least some types of incomplete information." Id. The court
acknowledged that § 1681i explicitly mentions the completeness of information, but rejected the
assertion that the absence of the completeness standard from § 168 1e(b) signals that Congress did
not intend to include it. Id. In fact, the court cited Senator Proxmire's remarks in the FCRA's
legislative history as evidence of this assertion: "[t]he failure of section 1681e(b)'s language itself
to specifically mention completeness in addition to accuracy may well be attributable to the fact
that it was added so late in the legislative process that there was not time for careful semantic
accommodation with earlier adopted provisions." Id.
141. Compare Heupel v. Trans Union LLC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2002)
(requiring that a CRA produce credit reports that contain only "technically accurate"
information), and Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (finding accurate a credit report that reported a debt that plaintiffs had already paid off),
with Koropoulos, 734 F.2d at 42 (emphasizing the need to carefully weigh the potential that
information on a credit report could be misleading against the burden of retrieving such
information in determining whether a § 1681e(b) violation occurred).
142. See supra Part II.A.
143. See Griffith supra note 31, at 72 ("It might have been less complicated for Congress to
demand simply that reporting agencies ... use reasonable procedures to assure accuracy of the
information about the consumer. Instead, Congress required 'maximum possible accuracy,'
leaving no doubt that there was at least some minimum standard of accuracy that might not be
acceptable if it was reasonably possible for the agency to do better.").
144. Introduction of the Fair Credit Reporting Bill, supra note 6, at 2414 (Statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (remarking that the purpose of the bill that would become the FCRA was to "provide
consumers with more protection than they are now getting [and] ...to make uniform throughout
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the legislative history of the later amendments shows a faithful commitment to
this consumer-driven purpose.145
In contrast to this statutory intent to protect consumers, the case law does not

always reflect a pro-consumer attitude.1 46 The Todd court's analysis of the
plaintiffs' § 168le(b) claim is so cursory that it is inadequate to fully address
the plaintiffs' concerns about the accuracy of their credit report. 147 The court
stated that "[b]ecause the report is not inaccurate, [it must be concluded] . . .
that the Todds can not sustain their cause of action." 148 It then offered a
straight summary of the facts, which the court stated were "unquestionably
accurate" and "extremely important to merchants and retailers in deciding
whether or not to extend credit to persons such as the plaintiff."' 149 The court's
recitation of the facts and very brief analysis of the Todds' accuracy claims
shows an unwillingness to adopt a pro-consumer attitude, as the FCRA
requires. 150 When courts do choose to adopt a pro-consumer approach as
espoused in Koropoulos, they are more reluctant to grant summary judgment to
defendants.151

The court in Koropolous acknowledged that the FCRA's reasonableness
requirement "severely limits an agency's duty to maximally assure precise and
the industry procedures designed to insure the consumer's right to a reporting system that is
accurate and relevant and which safeguards confidentiality"); S. REP. No. 91-517, at 1 (1969)
("The purpose of the fair credit reporting bill is to prevent consumers from being unjustly
damaged because of inaccurate or arbitrary information [and] ... to prevent an undue invasion of
the individual's right of privacy in the collection and dissemination of credit information.").
145. July 9, 2003 Hearings, supra note 51, at 208 (prepared statement of the Honorable
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (stating "it is critical that our credit
system protect the rights of consumers in the privacy, security, and accuracy of their financial
information").
146. See, e.g., Davis v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170-72 (N.D. Ala.
2004) (holding that defendant CRA did not violate the FCRA by deleting a mortgage account
from the plaintiffs consumer report); Heupel, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 n.1 (following the Todd
framework denying plaintiffs § 1681 e(b) claim since "the Todd approach is fairer to reporting
agencies and a better conservator ofjudicial resources").
147. See Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 414-15 (4th Cir. 2001)
(showing that Congress's motivation to enact the FCRA was concern for protecting consumers in
light of the abuses in the credit industry); S. REP. No. 91-517, at 1 (1969) (construing the FCRA
to be a bill whose purpose "is to prevent consumers from being unjustly damaged because of
inaccurate or arbitrary information in a credit report").
151. See, e.g., Yourke v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. C 06-2370, 2007 WL 1795705,
at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2007) (adopting the Koropoulos approach and denying defendant
CRA's motion for summary judgment on the basis that there is a triable issue of fact as to
plaintiffs' § 1681 e(b) claims); Evantash v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV- 1188,
2003 WL 22844198, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003) (relying on Koropoulos to hold that
plaintiff did show that she had a prima facie case for a § 168le(b) claim).
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complete reporting."' 152 However, the court did recognize that "certain
distinctions . . . may be so fundamental to the message [the] credit report
conveys that it153is reasonable to place a burden on the credit reporting agency to
report them."
What are those "certain distinctions"? 154 The court mentions the distinction
between bankruptcy and wage earner plans as being so fundamental to the
message of the credit report that it merits the burden on a CRA to report
them.'
Unfortunately, the court does not expand on this dissimilarity. 56 One
could question whether distinctions between ex-spouses who are joint obligors
on an account that is part of the bankruptcy proceedings of the other spouse,
as
1 57
the plaintiff in Heupel was forced to contend, also merit the same burden.
C. Consumers Should Be Rewardedfor Attempting to CorrectInaccuracies on
CreditReports
It has been argued that a consumer's vigilance in monitoring her consumer
report is a surefire method of combating the problems of inaccuracy of
consumer reports.1 58 Case law shows that plaintiffs have gone to great lengths
to rectify perceived inaccuracies on their credit reports before bringing
lawsuits alleging violations of § 1681e(b). 159 In both Boothe and Yourke, the
plaintiffs made numerous
attempts to correct their credit reports upon
60
discovering inaccuracies.'

152. Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Heupel v. Trans Union LLC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1237-38 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
158. See Avery et al., supra note 7, at 72 (suggesting that consumer vigilance may be a
possible remedy for problems with inaccuracies in a consumer's credit files). But see Nehf, supra
note 1, at 794-95 ("Even if a consumer gains access to information stored in his file at a credit
bureau, the exercise yields no economic benefit unless erroneous or misleading information is
purged from the consumer reporting system.").
159. See, e.g., Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (1 1th Cir.
1991) (highlighting that plaintiff submitted a customer dispute form and a number of letters to
two separate CRAs in an effort to correct misleading information on his consumer report);
Yourke v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 06-2370, 2007 WL 1795705, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal.
June 20, 2007) (describing the repeated efforts that the plaintiff made in contacting the CRA to
dispute the accuracy of his consumer report); Evantash v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc., No.
02-CV-1 188, 2003 WL 22844198, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003) (delineating the plaintiffs
efforts in contacting the defendant CRA to get the inaccurate bankruptcy notation on her
consumer report removed).
160. Yourke, 2007 WL 1795705, at *1-2; Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 768 F. Supp. 434,
435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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The Yourke opinion is notable because the court considered the plaintiffs
efforts to correct his consumer report. 61 The court concluded that the CRA's
failure to correct the plaintiffs consumer report "until five months after [the
plaintiff] first complained, and only under continued pressure" from the
plaintiff created a triable issue of fact162as to whether the CRA had reasonable
procedures in place under § 1681 i(a).
By contrast, the court in Boothe did not consider the fact that the plaintiff
disputed the accuracies of his consumer reports. Instead, the court chose to
focus on the court documents showing that the so-called "errors" on plaintiff's
credit report were technically accurate.' 63 As a result, the court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff's § 168 1e(b)
claims. 164
III. ENSURING NATIONAL APPLICATION OF THE KOROPOULOS PRINCIPLES BY
AMENDING § 1681 E(B)

Even though credit reporting today is a process completed largely by
166
Even when
in credit reporting are an undeniable reality.
computers, 165 errors
the FCRA was first passed, the potential for computer errors in credit reporting

161. Yourke, 2007 WL 1795705, at *5 (reasoning that "after Yourke demonstrated that the
liens had all been released with the payment of little or no money, Experian's continued inclusion
of the liens as released but with the full amount for which they were originally filed could be
viewed as misleading").
162. Id. at *5.
163. Boothe, 768 F. Supp. at 438 ("Boothe offers no evidence to dispute the substance of
either of these records confirming the accuracy of the information contained in Boothe's credit
profile.").
164. Id.
165. See Kenneth Gunter, Computerized Credit Scoring's Effect on the Lending Industry, 4
N.C. BANKING INST. 443, 443 (2000). Gunter notes that credit decisions were formerly based
upon a complex set of financial criteria analyzed by institutional lending officers. Id. Now,
however, credit investigations are produced "by a method in which a computer program takes
information provided by the applicant, as well as several outside sources, and . . . produces a
single number by which to rate the applicant's credit risk." Id.
166. See Introduction of the Fair Credit Reporting Bill, supra note 6, at 2411 (statement of
Sen. Proxmire) (Senator Proxmire referenced the problem of errors in credit reporting and
cautioned that the problem of errors in credit reporting and cautioning that "[e]veryone is a
potential victim of an inaccurate credit report. If not today, then perhaps tomorrow."); see also
Maurer & Thomas, supra note 133, at 612 (citing one study in which the rate of error in credit
reporting was about thirty-three percent, calculated by comparing the number of errors
investigated with the number of consumer reports that had been issued).
Senator Proxmire's introduction to the fair credit reporting bill reflected lawmakers' concern
about the pervasiveness of credit reporting errors. Introduction of the Fair Credit Reporting Bill,
supra note 6, at 2411 (statement of Sen. Proxmire). Concern over credit reporting errors
continues today. In testimony before the passage of the 2003 FACT Act, a representative from
the National Consumer Law Center stated that twenty-nine percent of credit reports contained
"serious errors" including listing accounts that never belonged to the consumer. June 4, 2003
Hearings,supra note 1, at 94 (testimony of Anthony Rodriguez).
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was a major concern. 16 7 Because errors are bound to occur, procedures and
remedies for correcting the errors must be as strong as possible in order to
remain true to the goals of the FCRA.
A. Consumer Protection, the Foundationof the FCRA, Is Enhancedby
Uniform Application of the Law
The legislative history of the FCRA and its amendments demonstrate the
need for uniform national standards. 168 Furthermore, both the 1996 and 2003
amendments to the FCRA reflect the importance of enacting uniform national
standards. 169
In deciding § 1681e(b) claims, courts have to choose which application of
the law they will follow: the Koropoulos balancing test or the technical
accuracy approach. 170 This choice gives courts too much discretion in
deciding how to apply this consumer protection law. The FCRA is a federal1
law that should protect consumers uniformly throughout the country.17
Therefore, the interpretation and application of the FCRA must also be

uniform. 172

167. Introduction of the Fair Credit Reporting Bill, supra note 6, at 2411 (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (remarking that even in 1969 "[w]ith the growing trend toward computerization, the
incidence of computer errors is on the [rise]").
168. S. REP. No. 91-517, at 3-4 (1969). This report noted that the credit reporting industry
has "agreed upon the need for Federal legislation to insure that guidelines apply uniformly and
fairly to all segments of the industry." Id. at 3. Additionally, in the legislative history of the 2003
amendments to the FCRA, FTC Chairman Timothy Muris referenced the need for the legislation
to make a permanent renewal of the FCRA's "uniform national standards." July 9, 2003
Hearings, supra note 51, at 208 (prepared statement of the Honorable Timothy J. Muris,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
169. See STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at 2
(discussing the importance of uniform national standards to the 1996 amendments). The 2003
amendments to the FCRA also underscore the importance of uniform national standards:
Abandoning uniform national standards would mark a radical change in a credit
reporting system that has evolved almost entirely without state or local regulation of its
core functions. Such a step puts at risk the benefits that flow from the existing national
reporting system-the foundation for the most dynamic consumer and mortgage credit
markets in the world.
Id. at I.
170. See, e.g., Evantash v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV-1 188, 2003 WL
22844198, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003). In deciding which application of the law to follow, the
court stated that "[b]ecause the Third Circuit has not endorsed the 'technical accuracy defense,'
we shall apply the less stringent approach articulated in Koropoulos." Id. (footnote omitted).
171. See STATEN & CATE, THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING, supra note 3, at
25 ("Proposals to abandon uniform national standards ... threaten the diverse array of benefits
that flow from the current credit reporting system under the FCRA.").
172. See Introduction of the Fair Credit Reporting Bill, supra note 6, at 2414 (statement of
Sen. Proxmire) ("The bill does not seek to curb the growth of credit reporting agencies but rather
to make uniform throughout the industry procedures designed to insure the consumer's right to a
reporting system that is accurate and relevant.").
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B. The Koropoulos Approach Should Be Adopted as the National Standard
The Koropoulos balancing test establishes that courts should weigh the
misleading nature of the consumer report information that the consumer is
disputing against the availability of ascertaining more accurate or complete
information.1 73 This balancing test seeks to find an equilibrium between a
consumer's right to have the most accurate credit report possible and the
burden of ensuring accuracy that is placed on the CRA.
The Koropoulos approach must be followed because of its expansive
understanding of accuracy and because it "protects an agency which does its
best to get at the facts." 17 By allowing the element of completeness to become
a factor in the accuracy of consumer reports, the Koropoulos court avoided the
mistake that the court in Grant made by taking such a narrow view of the
maximum possible accuracy standard of § 1681e(b).17 6 The Grant court
mistakenly attempted to separate accuracy and completeness, two concepts that
are inevitably intertwined.
C. Section 1681e(b) Needs Revision
Although the requirement of maximum possible accuracy in § 168 le(b) has
not been revised since its inception, the case law and other revisions to the
FCRA have enhanced the accuracy requirements.178 This section of the FCRA
must be revised to state the following: whenever a consumer reporting agency
prepares a consumer report, it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure
of the information concerning
maximum possible accuracy and completeness
79
the individual about whom the report relates.1
The court in Koropoulos incorporated the concept of completeness into its
maximum possible accuracy analysis under § 168le(b) because it did not think
that
The court believed
intentional.'"
theintend
statutetowas
its exclusion
that
reports from
exclude
altogether incomplete
did not,from
in fact,
"Congress

173. Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
174. See Griffith, supranote 31, at 72.
175. Id.
176. See Grant v. TRW, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 690, 692-93 (D. Md. 1992).
177. See id.at 692 (stating accuracy and completeness are "qualitatively different"). In
Grant, the court defined the term "accuracy" as something that "can be tested by verification."
Id. In contrast, the court argued that "a determination of 'completeness' requires the exercise of
judgment on potentially difficult questions concerning the meaning and effect of contextual
see also Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 830 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 n.2 (S.D. Ind.
information." Id.;
1993), rev'don other grounds, 29 F.3d 280, 285 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994).
178. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
179. See generally Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(suggesting that Congress did not "intend to exclude" completeness from § 1681e(b)); Griffith,
supra note 31, at 72 (supporting the Koropoulos approach).
180. See Koropoulos, 739 F.2d at 44.
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section 168 l e(b)'s requirement of reasonable procedures. ' i 1 Rather, the court
asserted that the absence of the word "completeness" from this section of the
FCRA was the result of clumsy legislative drafting.' 82 Koropoulos relied on
the testimony of Senator Proxmire and others to show that Congress used the
83
terms "'accuracy' and 'completeness' interchangeably."',
Accuracy standards must be as strong as possible because frequently
consumers are not aware that their credit reports are being accessed and
evaluated. 8 4 For instance, in the process called "pre-screening," CRAs are
permitted to furnish consumer reports in connection with credit transactions
not initiated by the consumer if the transaction consists of a firm offer of
credit.185 Although the consumer does have the option to opt-out of these
prescreened offers of credit,1 86 it is not known the extent to which consumers
actually take advantage of this opt-out opportunity. 187 Furthermore, although
the information provided on a consumer's report under this provision is
minimal, a consumer's name is still generated as being part of a certain bracket
of credit scores.'
Consequently, undiscovered inaccuracies on a consumer's
credit report may contribute to misinformation
about a consumer's credit
1 89
profile being disseminated to potential creditors.
IV. CONCLUSION

The varied interpretations of the maximum possible accuracy requirement of
the FCRA show a need for congressional action. The FCRA is crucial to the
functioning of the credit reporting industry and the protection of consumers'

181. Id.
182. See id.The court reasoned that "[t]he failure of section 1681 e(b)'s language itself to
specifically mention completeness in addition to accuracy may well be attributable to the fact that
it was added so late in the legislative process that there was not time for careful semantic
accommodation with earlier adopted provisions." Id.
183. Idat44n.12.
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2000) (indicating the various non-consumer initiated purposes
for which credit reports may be used). One of the permissible purposes for which a CRA may
furnish a consumer report to a third party is through the process of pre-screening. See supra note
28.
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 168 lb(c)(1)(B)(i); Richard Gottlieb, Firm Offers of Credit: Recent
Developments, CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 596, 596 (2006).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1b(e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
187. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REP. TO THE CONG. ON FURTHER
RESTRICTIONS ON UNSOLICITED WRITTEN OFFERS OF CREDIT AND INSURANCE 15 (Dec. 2004);

Taft & Poulon, supra note 13, at 201 ("[M]any commenters believe that consumers are unaware
of the ability to opt out of [prescreened] solicitations and the method for exercising such right.").
188. See April B. Chang, Note, Valuables in Your Mailbox? How the Concept of Value in
Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc. Enhances the FCRA's Guidelines Concerning Creditor Marketing, 10
N.C. BANKING INST. 209, 213 (2006).
189. See Avery et al., supra note 7, at 50 (describing the frequency of errors in consumer
reports and the potential for those errors to be the cause of the denial of credit for consumers).
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interests. Thus, consistent national standards of consumer protection should be
the law when consumer rights are the subject of the debate.
The best interpretation of "maximum possible accuracy" puts a high burden
on the CRAs to ensure that they produce consumer reports with information
that is accurate in all senses of the word: factually correct and complete.
Courts should not be deciding whether to hold CRAs to a standard that is
factually correct, and without misleading or incomplete information, or to a
standard that is merely "technically accurate." Rather, § 1681e(b) of the
FCRA must be amended to require a uniform national standard of maximum
possible accuracy and completeness. If it is true that "[a] poor credit history is
the 'Scarlet Letter' of twentieth century America, ' 19° then no American
consumer should have to wear that letter undeservedly.

190. June 4, 2003 Hearings,supra note 1 (testimony of Anthony Rodriguez, Staff Attorney,
National Consumer Law Center).

